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CRYPTIC CONTROVERSY: U.S. GOVERNMENT 
RESTRICTIONS ON CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORTS 
AND THE PLIGHT OF PHILIP ZIMMERMANN 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 9, 1994, Philip Zimmermann, a computer 
software engineer who lives in Boulder, Colorado, passed through 
customs at Dulles International Airport.l Zimmermann was 
returning from Europe, where he had been invited to speak on 
issues of public policy.2 At the airport, a Customs Special Agent 
diverted Zimmermann from the normal customs process and 
subjected him to an individualized luggage search and a lengthy 
interrogation regarding Zimmerman's possible illegal exportation 
of dangerous munitions.3 What was the dangerous "weapon" 
which interested the U.S. Government so much that it would 
individually interrogate a U.S. citizen? It was computer 
software.4 
Specifically, the software in question is called Pretty Good 
Privacy, or PGP.5 PGP, created by Zimmermann, is computer 
software that transforms plain English data from nearly any 
personal computer into an encoded6 version that can only be 
read by its intended recipient.7 PGP encodes data so well, in 
fact, that it is used by everyone from Russian freedom fighters to 
American criminals to maintain the secrecy of their 
1. Letter from Kenneth C. Bass, m, Attorney for Philip Zimmermann, to Homer 
Williams, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal Affairs, United States 





5. Id.; William M. Bulkeley, Cipher Probe: Popularity Overseas of Encryption Code 
Has the U.S. Worried, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1994, at AI. 
6. The process of encoding data in this manner is generally referred to as the 
science of "cryptography." Software that encodes data using cryptography, therefore, is 
referred to as "cryptographic" or "encryption" software. Those who practice the science 
of cryptology are called "cryptanalysts" or "cryptographers." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 312 (1987). 
7. Bulkeley, supra note 5. 
581 
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communications.s It is this effectiveness that worries the U.S. 
Government so much that in 1993 a Federal grand jury in San 
Jose, California opened a criminal investigation into whether the 
worldwide distribution of PGP violated United States laws 
prohibiting the export of powerful cryptographic software.9 
This Note will examine the constitutionality of United States 
export controls of cryptographic software, in the context of both 
the Zimmermann case and other significant cases of the past 
decade. Section I will first present a concise history of the science 
of cryptography and its importance to the U.S. Government. 
Next, Section II will summarize the relevant statutory and 
regulatory provisions that govern the export of cryptographic 
software. Sections III and IV will examine the constitutionality of 
these restrictions from the perspective of the First and Fifth 
Amendments, respectively. Finally, Section V will discuss 
whether regulation of cryptographic exports is a non-justiciable 
"political question" in the context of recent Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuit cases. 
1. HISTORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Cryptography dates back to 405 B.C., when Lysander of Sparta 
was one of the first military leaders to use encoded messages to 
communicate with his confederates.1o For the majority of its 
history, cryptography was a vital and exclusive tool of 
governments, not the public.l1 During World War I, British 
cryptanalysts used a decoded German message, which implored 
Mexico to ally with Germany against the United States, to 
convince the United States to enter the war against Germany.12 
Later, in World War II, Allied cryptanalysts cracked the German 
and Japanese cipher systems, which contributed greatly to the 
Allied war effort. 13 
With the emergence of advanced computer technology, 
however, a strong new demand arose for private encryption 
8. Id. 
9. John Markoff, Federal Inquiry on Software Examines Privacy Programs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1993, at Dl. 
10. BRUCE NORMAN, SECRET WARFARE: THE BATI'LE OF CODES AND CIPHERS 15 
(1973). 
11. Long Live NSA: Why Congress Wanted to Clip the Agency's Wings, INFO. L . 
.ALERT: VOORHEES REP., Mar. 25, 1994, at *2 [hereinafter Long Live NSA). 
12. NORMAN, supra note 10, at 58-60. 
13. DAVID KAHN, KAHN ON CODES: SECRETS OF THE NEW CRYPTOLOGY 56 (1986). 
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technology.14 This demand developed the industry known as 
"public cryptography."15 
The first and most rudimentary cryptographic systems16 were 
referred to as "non-keyed" systems. 17 In these systems, the 
sender uses a pre-determined algorithm to encode the message, 
such as substituting each letter in the message with the letter 
that is three letters higher in the alphabet.18 For example, A 
becomes D, B becomes E, and so forth. The drawback to this 
system is that if a third party determines the algorithm, it 
becomes a simple matter for that third party to read the 
encrypted messages.19 
The next stage of cryptography was "single-key" systems.20 In 
a single-key system, encryption and decryption of a message are 
accomplished by entering a password or ''key.,,21 The advantage 
of this system is that so long as the key remains a secret, it is 
very difficult to decipher.22 However, since the same key must 
be passed between the communicating parties to perform the 
encryption process, it is possible that the key could be revealed to 
a third party.23 The current federal standard for data 
encryption, called DES, is based on single-key cryptography.24 
The most recent innovation in cryptography, the method 
utilized in PGP, is "public-key" cryptography.25 In public-key 
cryptography, two keys are used: a public key, used to encrypt 
messages, and a private key, used to decrypt messages.26 Two 
14. Long Live NSA, supra note 11, at *2. 
15. Public cryptography is the development and use of cryptographic technology by 
private parties, without governmental oversight or assistance. Kenneth J. Pierce, 
Comment, Public Cryptography, Arms Export Controls, and the First Amendment: A 
Need for Legislation, 17 CORNELL lNT'L L.J. 197, 198 n.5 (1984). 
16. The process by which a certain encryption program will encrypt data is often 
referred to, in mathematical circles, as the "encryption algorithm." Ira S. Rubenstein, 
Export Controls on Encryption Software, in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS: 
1994, at 177, *3 (PLI Com. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 705, 1994). 
17. Jeff Prosise, How to Keep it a Secret (Data Encryption Methods and How They 
Work), PC MAG., July 1, 1994, at 315. 
18. [d. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. at 316. 
21. [d. 
22. [d. 
23. Karl L. Barrus, Pretty Good Privacy-Protecting Your Privacy, NETWORK 
COMPUTING, Apr. 1, 1995, at 146. 
24. Prosise, supra note 17, at 321. 
25. Barrus, supra note 23, at *2. 
26. [d. at *1. 
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advantages of a public-key system are convenience and security. 
It allows the sender to freely distribute his or her public key so 
that messages may be readily encrypted and sent, but the sender 
may keep his or her private key, required to decrypt the 
messages, totally private and secure.27 
One of the best public-key algorithms was developed in 1978 
by three mathematicians: Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len 
Adelman. Known as RSA, this algorithm combines the security of 
public-key cryptography with "digital signatures," which allows 
the sender of a message to add an encrypted electronic 
"signature" that is unforgeable.28 PGP is based upon the RSA 
algorithm.29 
The creation of PGP was a direct result of the federal ''key 
escrow" proposals.30 Philip Zimmermann, working in Colorado 
as a computer consultant at the time of the first key escrow 
proposals, vehemenently disagreed with the idea of key escrow to 
the point that he decided to create his own public cryptography 
standard for free distribution.31 
Zimmermann labored for six months in creating PGP, and 
when he was finished, he had created a public-key cryptography 
system that implemented the advanced RSA algorithm in an 
easy-to-use fashion for any home computer.32 When it was 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at *2. 
29. Id. at *3. 
30. First proposed in 1990, the key escrow system, which was reincarnated in 1993 
as the Clinton Administration's "Clipper Chip" proposal, was the U.S. Government's 
proposed solution to the tension between data privacy and effective law enforcement. 
This was a program whereby manufacturers of secure data devices, such as cellular 
phones, fax machines, and computer modems, would install secure cryptographic 
systems, based upon a secret algorithm developed by the National Security Agency, in 
their products. While providing secure data encryption, these systems would have a 
secret "back door" that would allow law enforcement agencies, upon a court order, to 
obtain an escrowed "key" to the device, which would allow the agencies to decrypt 
and monitor the communications. In attempting to make the key escrow system the 
federal encryption standard, the U.S. Government has engendered widespread outrage 
among civil libertarians. Sandy Shore, Feds Target Software Expert Who Developed 
Code to Encrypt Data-Computers: Among Some Civil Libertarians, Philip 
Zimmermann Has Achieved a Kind of Cult·hero Status in the Growing Debate Ouer 
Electronic-Privacy Issues, Los ANGELES TIMEs, Aug. 14, 1994, at 2; Bulkeley, supra 
note 5, at AB. 
31. Bulkeley, supra note 5, at AB. 
32. Id.; Barrus, supra note 23, at *2-*3. Note that immediately after PGP was 
released to the public in 1991, the firm that had initially developed RSA claimed that 
Zimmermann had used one of their patented encryption algorithms without 
permission, a claim which Zimmermann disputed at the time. This controversy was 
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released in 1991, PGP was a milestone in the development of 
public cryptography.33 For the first time, military-grade 
cryptography was available to the public, a level of security so 
high that even the ultra-secret, code-breaking computers at the 
National Security Agency could not decipher the encrypted 
messages.34 
After its initial release, PGP quickly became "the de facto 
worldwide standard for encryption of E-mail.,,35 Volunteer 
computer programmers made enhancements to the original PGP 
program and translated it to work with many different computer 
systems.36 A wide variety of people found PGP and its 
unbreakable code an invaluable tool: human-rights advocates 
who could not compromise their sources, writers who wished to 
electronically transmit chapters of books without divulging the 
contents to the public, and criminals who used PGP to hide sets 
of books that recorded drug transactions.37 
PGP was so well-regarded that in mid-1991, soon after its 
release, one of Zimmermann's friends, who had received one of 
the initial copies of PGP, placed a copy of PGP on the Internet.3s 
After that, it was only a matter of time before computer users all 
over the world were using PGP to encrypt their most sensitive 
data.39 With the worldwide proliferation of PGP, the U.S. 
Government began to take a serious interest in Phil 
Zimmermann. 
II. U.S. GoVERNMENT REGULATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC SOFTWARE 
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to 
regulate foreign trade.40 As early as 1954, Congress enacted 
eventually settled when distributors of PGP obtained a license to use the RSA 
algorithm. Bulkeley, supra note 5, at AS. 
33. See Markoff, supra note 9, at D3; Bulkeley, supra note 5, at AS. 
34. Bulkeley, supra note 5, at AI, AS. 
35. Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade, and the Environment: Hearing on 
Mass Market Cryptography and Export Controls, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1993) 
{hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Philip Zimmermann, Computer Software 
Consultant). 
36. Barrus, supra note 23, at *2-*3. 
37. Bulkeley, supra note 5, at AS. 
3S. Id. The Internet is a worldwide network of computers, both publicly and 
privately owned, which are linked together and accessible to the public. Kevin Maney, 
It's Big, It's Confusing-So Why All the Fuss?, USA TODAY, Nov. 13, 1995, at E1. 
39. Bulkeley, supra note 5, at AS. 
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § S. 
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legislation to regulate the export of weapons and munitions.41 
The current statutory authority for federal regulation of weapons 
and munitions exports is the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 
(AECA).42 In it, Congress delegates authority to control the 
import and export of "defense articles" and "defense services" to 
the President of the United States "[i]n furtherance of world 
peace and the security. . . of the United States."43 The AECA 
provides for export control with several basic components: (1) 
items considered to be defense articles subject to export control 
under AECA shall be placed on the United States Munitions List; 
(2) creation of a licensing system whereby would-be exporters of 
items on the U.S. Munitions List must apply to the federal 
government for an export license; and (3) criminal penalties for 
violations of the AECA. 44 
The President, in turn, delegated his enforcement authorities 
under the AECA to the Secretary of State via the International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).45 It is the ITAR that 
provides the practical administrative guidelines under which the 
export of dangerous munitions, such as cryptographic software, is 
regulated.46 
Procedurally, the ITAR specifies the items that are part of the 
U.S. Munitions List and therefore subject to export control.47 
Items that are eligible for placement on the Munitions List 
include those items "specifically designed, developed, configured, 
adapted, or modified for a military application"48 and which do 
not have "predominant civil applications."49 Among the items on 
the Munitions List are the following: 
[C]ryptographic devices, software, and components 
specifically designed or modified therefor, including: (1) 
Cryptographic (including key management) systems, 
equipment, assemblies, modules, integrated circuits, 
41. Mutual Security Act of 1954, ch. 937, 68 Stat. 832 (repealed 1976). 
42. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994). 
43. Id. § 2778(a)(1). 
44. Id. § 2778(a)-(c). 
45. 22 C.F.R. § 120.1 (1995). Note that, pursuant to this regulation, the actual 
delegation of authority from the President to the Secretary of State was done via 
Executive Order 11958, as amended (42 Fed. Reg. 4311 (1977». However, the ITAR 
provides the pertinent administrative regulations for the purposes of this Note. 
46. 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a) (1995). 
47. Id. § 121.1 (1995). 
48. Id. § 120.3(a). 
49. Id. § 120.3(a)(i). 
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components or software with the capability of maintaining 
secrecy or confidentiality of information or information 
systems, except cryptographic equipment and software as 
follows: [provides exemptions for mass-produced copy-
protected software, banking machines, and low-grade 
cryptographic devices].5o 
587 
A person in the United States cannot export51 either an item 
specifically enumerated on the Munitions List or "technical 
data ... and defense services ... related to the defense articles 
listed in [Category XIII, which contains cryptographic items],,52 
without an export license from the State Department Office of 
Defense Trade Controls (ODTC).53 License requests are 
considered by ODTC on a case-by-case basis.54 
There are, however, several exceptions to the licensing 
requirement that could impact the export of cryptographic 
software such as PGP. The first of these is the public domain 
exception, which is "driven by First Amendment concerns and 
represents the government's effort to balance national security 
controls and protected speech.,,55 This exception essentially 
provides that any information that is generally available to the 
public is exempt from the ITAR licensing requirement.56 
50. Id. § 121.1, Category XIII(b). 
51. The !TAR defines "export" in § 120.17 as: "(1) Sending or taking a defense 
article out of the United States in any manner, except by mere travel outside of the 
United States by a person whose personal knowledge includes technical data ... (4) 
Disclosing (including oral or visual disclosure) or transferring technical data to a 
foreign person, whether in the United States or abroad." Id. § 120.17. 
52. Id. § 121.1, Category XIIICk). Note that, in sections 120.10(a)(I), (4), the ITAR 
dermes "technical data" as: "(1) Information, other than software... which is 
required for the design development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, 
repair, testing, maintenance or modification of defense articles. This includes . . . 
blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, instructions and documentation ... (4) 
Software as defined in § 121.8(0 of this subchapter directly related to defense 
articles." Id. § 120.10. "Software," in turn, is defined in § 121.8(0 as: "[including] 
but ... not limited to the system functional design, logic flow, algorithms, 
application programs, operating systems and support software for design, 
implementation, test, operation, diagnosis and repair." Id. § 121.8(f). 
53. Id. § 125.2(a). 
54. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(2) (1994). 
55. Rubenstein, supra note 16, at *4. 
56. The specific definition of "public domain" in the ITAR is: 
[I]nformation which is published and which is generally accessible or 
available to the public: (1) Through sales at newsstands and bookstores; 
(2) Through subscriptions which are available without restriction to any 
individual. .. (4) At libraries open to the public... (6) Through 
unlimited distribution at a conference, meeting, seminar, trade show or 
7
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There are different interpretations as to whether the public 
domain exception would apply to cryptographic software in the 
public domain, such as PGP.57 Resolution of this question turns 
on the definition one imparts to certain sections of the ITAR. 
Under one view, shared by many software developers, software is 
defined as technical data under Section 120.10 of the ITAR, and 
since technical data in the public domain, such as PGP, is 
exempt from the ITAR licensing requirements under Section 
125.1(a), public domain encryption software would qualify for an 
exemption from ITAR licensing. 58 
A different result is reached if one looks at the plain regulatory 
text of the Munitions List and Section 123. All items specifically 
enumerated on the Munitions List, which includes both 
cryptographic software and related technical data, require an 
export license, and the provisions of Section 123 will "trump" the 
public domain exception under Section 125.1(a).59 Further, if one 
interprets the definition of "defense services" under Section 120.9 
to include the export of technical data, then Section 124, which 
controls the export of defense services, would require licensure of 
any technical data which might appear to fall under the public 
domain exception of Section 125.1(a).60 
The AECA provides criminal sanctions for a violation of any 
section of the ITAR: imprisonment of up to ten years or a fine of 
up to one million dollars.sl Philip Zimmermann, creator of PGP, 
became the target of a federal criminal investigation, potentially 
subject to criminal sanctions, in 1993.62 Federal prosecutors are 
examining whether the indirect transmission of PGP overseas 
that resulted from its posting on the Internet violated the AECA 
and ITAR.63 
exhibition, generally accessible to the public, in the United States; . . . 
(8) Through fundamental research in science and engineering at 
accredited institutions of higher learning in the U.S. where the resulting 
information is ordinarily published and shared broadly in the scientific 
community. 
22 C.F.R. § 120.11(a) (1995). 
57. See Rubenstein, supra note 16, at *6. 
58. Id. at *6, *7. 
59. Id. at *7. 
60. Id. 
61. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1994). 
62. Shore, supra note 30, at 3. 
63. See id. at 1. 
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III. THE ITAR REGULATIONS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that 
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of 
speech.,,64 Zimmermann's public distribution of PGP was, in all 
probability, a protected form of speech under the First 
Amendment, as several decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court 
indicate. 
Although the Court has made clear, in Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. Inc.,65 that 
commercial speech does not enjoy the same level of protection as 
other forms of speech,66 Zimmermann's conduct in distributing 
PGP is likely not commercial speech. Zimmermann distributed 
PGP for free,67 without profit or advertisement, and did so 
primarily for political reasons (to protest the unilateral 
imposition of government cryptography standards).68 
Therefore, if one were to consider Zimmermann's actions as 
political or scientific in nature, rather than commercial, the 
landmark decision of Miller v. California69 offers some guidance. 
In Miller, the Court stated the basic proposition that "[t]he First 
Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have 
serious ... political, or scientific value.n70 Further, if one were 
to consider the distribution of PGP as a scholarly or academic 
endeavor, then University of California Regents v. Bakke7l would 
apply. Bakke emphasizes that "[a]cademic freedom, though not a 
specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been 
viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment. ,,72 
Accepting the premise that the distribution of PGP is protected 
by the First Amendment73 raises the question of whether the 
64. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 
65. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
66. See id. at 758-59. 
67. Bulkeley, supra note 5, at AI, A8. 
68. [d. at Al. 
69. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
70. [d. at 34. 
71. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
72. [d. at 312. 
73. In Bernstein II. United States Dep't of State, the District Court agreed with this 
proposition. Analogizing the "expressiveness" of computer programs to that of literary 
works under copyright laws, the court held that computer source code was protected 
speech under the First Amendment. 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1436 (N.D. Cal. 1996). But 
see generally United States v. Edler Indus., 579 F.2d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1978) (faced 
with a "colorable claim that the First Amendment furnishes a degree of protection for 
9
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ITAR regulations and the accompanying licensing system 
infringe on those protections to an unacceptable degree.74 In a 
First Amendment overbreadth ~alysis, a reviewing court will 
consider whether an activity that may be constitutionally 
regulated by the government is done so in a manner that 
"sweep[s] unnecessarily broadly and thereby invaders] the area of 
protected freedoms. »75 
To determine whether the ITAR, in prohibiting the export of 
public cryptography, sweeps unnecessarily broadly, a court must 
note that "even though the governmental purpose [is] legitimate 
and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that 
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be 
more narrowly achieved."76 
A facial challenge to the ITAR would be unlikely to succeed, as 
the Court has demonstrated that it is reluctant to strike down a 
statute on its face when there are a substantial number of 
situations in which the statute could be constitutionally 
applied.77 Here, there is little doubt that the majority of the 
items on the U.S. Munitions List, such as firearms, aircraft, and 
missile technology, are of sufficient national security interest to 
warrant a constitutional constraint on their export.78 The Court, 
however, has historically been most willing to apply the 
overbreadth doctrine to those statutes that affect fundamental 
First Amendment rights.79 
[defendant's] dissemination of technological information [in alleged violation of the 
!TAR]. . . [Ninth Circuit] deem[ed] it unnecessary in this case to resolve the precise 
scope of that protection"). 
74. One could question the ITAR from a First Amendment procedural perspective, 
claiming that the ITAR licensing system establishes an unconstitutional prior 
restraint on speech. This issue was addressed in Kenneth J. Pierce, Comment, Public 
Cryptography, Arms Export Controls, and The First Amendment: A Need for 
Legislation, 17 CORNELL lNT'L L.J. 197 (1984). There, the author traced the process of 
obtaining an ITAR license and concluded that because the AECA did not provide for 
judicial review of license determinations (see 22 U.S.C. § 2778(h) (1994», the ITAR 
did not meet the procedural requirements of a constitutional prior restraint on 
speech. Id. at 218-19. Moreover, Pierce claims that the legislative history of ITAR 
does not indicate sufficient congressional authorization for a system of prior restraint. 
Id. at 230-31. 
75. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964). 
76. Id. at 307-08 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960». 
77. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 (1974). 
78. 22 C.F.R. §§ 121.1, 121.3, 121.9, 121.16 (1995). See Edler, 579 F.2d at 520, for 
the general proposition that these types of items are of sufficient national security 
interest to constitutionally warrant export controls. "The federal government 
undeniably possesses the power to regulate the international arms traffic." Id. 
79. Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. 
10
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One of the first to argue that the ITAR suffered from First 
Amendment overbreadth was the u.s. Government. 
Correspondence between the U.S. Attorney General's Office, the 
u.s. House of Representatives, and the u.s. Senate evinced 
concerns that the ITAR "extends too broadly into an area of 
protected First Amendment speech."so The Attorney General 
believed that the ITAR could constitutionally be applied to 
prohibit exporters from intentionally assisting foreign enterprises 
in the acquisition of technology or from distributing technical 
data for the purpose of soliciting sales of a munition.81 However, 
he also believed any other application of the ITAR "to restrict the 
dissemination of technical data by persons who are not directly 
connected or involved in any way with any foreign conduct that 
may have dangerous potential for the United States ... raise[s] 
serious constitutional problems."s2 
In a 1989 Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Posey,83 the 
court addressed some of the First Amendment overbreadth issues 
surrounding arms export controls.84 The defendant was 
convicted of violating the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act 
(CAAA), an ITAR-like statute that prohibited the export of 
certain munitions to the Republic of South Africa.85 In his 
appeal, the defendant claimed his conviction violated the free 
speech protections of the First Amendment because the items he 
had exported to South Africa (aircraft technical manuals) were 
widely available in the United States public domain.86 
In rejecting the defendant's argument, the court recognized the 
legitimate government interest in preventing the flow of sensitive 
military information abroad. The court stated that even though 
the defense data exported by Posey was, in fact, widely available 
within the United States public domain, "national security 
REV. 235, 261 (1994). 
80. Letter from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant U.S. Attorney General, to Robert A. 
McConnell, Assistant U.S. Attorney General *1 (Aug. 28, 1984) (available in Georgia 
State University College of Law Library). 
81. Letter from Robert A. McConnell, Assistant U.S. Attorney General, to 
Honorable Clement J. Zablocki, U.S. House of Representatives *3, *4 (1983) (available 
in Georgia State University College of Law Library). 
82. [d. at *4. 
83. 864 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1989). 
84. See id. at 1496. 
85. [d. at 1490. For the text of the CAAA, see 22 U.S.C. § 5067 (1988) (repealed 
1993). 
86. Posey, 864 F.2d at 1490, 1496. 
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concerns may be more sharply implicated by the export abroad of 
military data than by the domestic disclosure of such data."87 
On its surface, the Posey decision may seem to rebut a First 
Amendment overbreadth argument for the export of public 
domain cryptographic technology under ITAR, which imposes 
essentially the same types of export restraints as the CAAA. 
However, closer examination of both the CAAA and the AECA-
ITAR systems reveals a crucial difference between the two. 
Under the AECA and ITAR, unlike the CAAA, Congress provided 
a specific exemption from export controls for those articles that 
are in the public domain.88 Thus, the narrow First Amendment 
holding of the court in Posey might not be controlling under the 
situation faced by Philip Zimmermann, where the controlling 
regulations have a specific public domain exception. 
The U.S. District Court recognized the viability of this type of 
First Amendment overbreadth claim in Bernstein v. United States 
Department of State.89 There, a developer of cryptographic 
software sought injunctive relief from the U.S. State 
Department's enforcement of the ITAR and the AECA, claiming 
that the export regulations are overbroad under the First 
Amendment.90 Despite arguments by the defendant that recent 
court decisions and legislation sufficiently narrowed the scope of 
the ITAR so as to place it beyond reach of an overbreadth attack, 
the court held that the plaintiff presented a colorable 
constitutional claim.91 Although an overbreadth attack was 
described as "strong medicine," it was justified where the statute 
in question placed obvious sanctions on protected conduct and 
had the potential to "significantly compromise the protected 
speech of third parties.,,92 
IV. THE ITAR REGULATIONS AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution93 provides that 
87. Id. at 1496-97. 
88. 22 C.F.R. § 125.1{a) (1995). 
89. 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
90. Id. at 1438. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 1438-39. 
93. In analyzing the relevant issues of substantive due process under the Fifth 
Amendment, which addresses federal government action, much of the case law cited 
refers to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which addresses state 
governmental action. Although these are separate amendments, the Court has 
12
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the Federal government shall not deprive a person of ''life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law."94 The term 
"due process" may refer to either procedural due process, which 
refers to the guarantees of procedural fairness in the justice 
system, or substantive due process, which refers to the general 
proposition that legislation must be fair and reasonable in 
content and cannot arbitrarily deprive a citizen of life, liberty, or 
property.95 
A Liberty Interest 
The concept of ''liberty'' within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment has been given an expansive reading by the 
COurt.96 It has been defined to be more than a freedom from 
physical, bodily restraint, but rather to include numerous other 
rights "long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men.,,97 Among the rights long 
recognized as part of the concept of liberty is the right to pursue 
one's chosen profession or calling.98 
Liberty, however, is not a completely unfettered right under 
the Fifth Amendment. A person's right to liberty, and therefore 
his right to pursue any lawful vocation, may be subject to 
reasonable government restraints that are not arbitrarily 
imposed.99 In determining whether such restraints are in fact 
interpreted the term "liberty" in the same manner under the due process clauses of 
both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Therefore, any general propositions 
relating to liberty and due process of Fourteenth Amendment case law will apply 
equally to Fifth Amendment situations. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 
(1976); Ernest H. Schopler, Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to Concept of 
"Liberty" Under Due Process Clauses of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 47 L. Ed. 
2d 975, 978 n.1 (1977). 
94. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
95. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1203, 1429 (6th ed. 1990). 
96. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
97. ld. 
98. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590 (1897) ("[The] enjoyment ... 
of the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade . . . is an essential part of 
[one's] rights of liberty and property, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.") 
(quoting Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1887»; Greene v. McElroy, 360 
U.S. 474, 492 (1959) (right to pursue one's chosen profession without undue 
government interference is protected by the liberty and property concepts of the Fifth 
Amendment); 16A AM. JUR. 2n Constitutional Law § 590, at 517-18 (1964) (right to 
pursue one's occupation is "one of the most sacred and most valuable rights of a 
citizen. A person's business, occupation, or calling is 'property' within the meaning of 
the constitutional provisions as to due process of law"). 
99. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400; 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 591 (1964), 
13
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reasonable and not arbitrarily imposed, the Court will often 
employ a balancing test that compares the significance of the 
liberty interest against the relevant governmental interest. 100 
This balancing test is particularly exacting in relation to the 
right to pursue one's profession, a right that has been deemed 
"fundamental" by the COurt.101 A court that reviews legislation 
curtailing the right to pursue one's profession must employ the 
"strict scrutiny" standard of review: the ends pursued by the 
legislation must be "compelling" and the legislation must be 
"narrowly tailored" to meet those ends. 102 
Philip Zimmermann's chosen profession is as a cryptographic 
software engineer; therefore, a strong argument may be made 
that by producing and distributing PGP, Zimmermann was 
pursuing his chosen profession.103 If this is true, then the AECA 
and ITAR have, in this case, acted to curtail one of 
Zimmermann's fundamental rights. Any court that reviews the 
constitutionality of the ITAR in this situation, therefore, must 
utilize the strict scrutiny standard of review. 
The obvious governmental interest furthered by the AECA and 
the ITAR is national security, as is plainly stated in the 
introduction to the AECA.104 There is no doubt that national 
security has long been considered by the Court as a compelling 
governmental interest. lOS The question thus arises whether 
and cases cited therein. 
100. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). 
101. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889); Hampton v. Mow Sun 
Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 
353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957); see also 16A AM. JUR. 20 Constitutional Law § 590, at 
518 (1964). In examining state or federal statutes for constitutional infIrmity, the 
Court has traditionally used a two-tier analysis. Laws or regulations that effect rights 
deemed by the Court to be "fundamental" usually fall in areas such as free speech, 
marriage, sex, child-rearing, and child-bearing. In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice 
Douglas grouped these rights under the term "penumbras" of privacy, a group of 
fundamental rights having their origin in the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth 
Amendments. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Laws which curtail a fundamental right will 
receive a more rigorous review by the Court than those laws that curtail a non-
fundamental right, which usually entail economic legislation. Id. 
102. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 11.4, at 371 
(4th ed. 1991). 
103. Hearings, supra note 35 (statement of Philip Zimmermann). 
104. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1994). 
105. See HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER 
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 74 (1990) ("From the very beginning, our 
Constitution has been obsessed with the idea of national security."); see also New 
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). In New York Times, where the 
14
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there is compelling governmental interest in national security to 
prohibit the export of public cryptography software such as PGP. 
It is a question that requires some historical analysis. In 1954, 
when the first predecessor to the AECA was passed (the Mutual 
Security Act),106 and in 1976, when the AECA was first passed, 
cryptography was a more sensitive technology than it is 
today.107 However, with the advent of widespread personal 
computer and communications technology, the finest military-
grade cryptographic technology is now legally available all over 
the world. lOS "The genie is out of the bottle," stated the 
president of a company that legally distributes PGP in the 
United States; "[t]here's no way anybody can stop the 
technology. ,,109 
Indeed, at the 1993 hearings before the U.S. House 
Subcommittee for Economic Policy, Trade, and the Environment 
regarding cryptography and export controls, data security experts 
testified that strong encryption packages are widely available in 
the public domain, both in the United States and abroad. no 
Most importantly, they noted, there are numerous foreign 
implementations of DES and other strong cryptographic 
algorithms developed entirely outside the United States and 
therefore beyond the jurisdiction of ITAR, which are readily 
available worldwide. lll Thus, as a practical matter, at the very 
u.s. sought to enjoin petitioner from publishing classified military studies of the 
Vietnam War (the "Pentagon Papers"), the Court weighed the value to the U.S. 
government of keeping the studies secret against the substantial infringement upon 
petitioner's First Amendment right to free expression. ld. at 718-19 (Black, J. 
concurring). The case is significant for this analysis because although the Court 
recognized the importance of national security as a governmental interest, it 
determined that such an interest must be compelling indeed to warrant any 
encroachment upon such sacred and fundamental rights as those of the First 
Amendment.ld. at 731 (White, J. concurring). 
106. Mutual Security Act of 1954, ch. 937, 68 Stat. 832 (repealed 1976). 
107. See Pierce, supra note 15. Until the late 1970's, cryptography was almost the 
exclusive province of the government. ld. at 199-203. In fact, the largest and most 
secretive entity in the American intelligence community, the National Security Agency 
(NSA), concerns itself almost entirely with cryptography. [d. at 201. It was the 
computer revolution of the 1980's which permanently entrenched both the need for 
and the availability of public cryptography. ld. at 199-201. 
108. See Lance Hoffman, SPA Study of Foreign Availability of Cryptography, SPA 
NEWS, Mar. 1994, at *2; Bulkeley, supra note 5. 
109. Bulkeley, supra note 5. 
110. See Hearings, supra note 35 (testimonies of Philip Zimmermann, J. Hendren, 
Ray Ozzie, Stephen Walker, Don Harbert). 
111. ld. It is important to note that the argument against a compelling national 
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least one could make a strong argument that the worldwide 
availability of such cryptographic power makes it unlikely that 
there is any compelling governmental interest in regulating the 
export of software such as PGP. 
B. Void for Vagueness 
An alternative Fifth Amendment criticism of the ITAR is that 
it is unconstitutionally vague and thus "void for vagueness.,,112 
The doctrine of void for vagueness, as with the doctrine of 
fundamental rights, stems from the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment and states that a statute is unconstitutionally 
vague when its language is such that reasonable people must 
necessarily guess as to the meaning of the law.113 To determine 
whether a statute is void for vagueness, a reviewing court will 
usually focus on whether the statute conveys clearly 
ascertainable standards and provides fair warning as to what 
type of conduct is prohibited. 114 
This does not mean, however, that a statute must meet 
impossible standards of definiteness. us A statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague simply because it is stringent, requires 
the trier of fact to determine reasonableness, or because clearer 
language could have been used.1l6 Moreover, a facially-vague 
statute may be saved from constitutional infirmity when a court 
imposes a narrowing construction on the statute.117 The Court, 
however, has historically been most willing to invoke the void for 
vagueness doctrine in those cases that concern fundamental 
security interest is not the worldwide prevalence of PGP, for if PGP were truly a 
threat to national security, its worldwide distribution would only serve to further 
bolster the argument that ITAR controls and Zimmermann's prosecution are necessary 
to prevent the recurrence of these types of "exports." Rather, it is the fact that 
foreign developers have already produced and distributed strong cryptographic 
algorithms, comparable to PGP, in the worldwide public domain. An April 1994 study 
by the Software Publishers Association supports this claim. Their study determined 
that there were over two hundred foreign hardware and soft;ware products, employing 
strong cryptographic algorithms similar to DES and PGP, distributed in over twenty 
different foreign nations. Hoffman, supra note 108, at *2. 
112. EFF Sues to Overturn Cryptography Restrictions, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION (News Release), Feb. 21, 1995, at 2 [hereinaft;er EFF Sues]. 
113. 16A AM. JUR. 2n Constitutional Law § 818, at 988 (1979). 
114. Id. at 989-90; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine 
in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 85-86 (1960). 




Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 14
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol13/iss2/14
HeinOnline -- 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 597 1996-1997
1997] RESTRICTIONS ON CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORTS 597 
guarantees, such as speech protected under the First 
Amendment. us 
Ironically, one of the first parties to raise the question of 
unconstitutional vagueness of the ITAR was the u.s. 
Government.U9 In correspondence between the U.S. Justice 
Department, Attorney General, and the U.S. Senate, legal 
analysts first expressed concerns in 1984 that the definitions of 
"technical data" and "export" under the ITAR were 
unconstitutionally broad under the current interpretation of the 
ITAR and had not yet received a sufficient narrowing 
construction from the courts.120 
Although the ITAR has since been amended to alter some of 
these definitions,121 there is still a rational argument to be 
made that aspects of the definitional elements of ITAR are 
unconstitutionally vague. One line of argument centers around 
the ITAR definition of "software,,122 and is aptly illustrated by 
the so-called "Karn-Schnier case.,,123 There, Phil Karn, a 
telecommunications engineer, applied to the State Department in 
1994 for an ITAR export license for two items: a book entitled 
"Applied Cryptography," which contained detailed computer 
source program listings124 for several powerful cryptographic 
118. Amsterdam, supra note 114, at 75, 94. "[T]he doctrine of unconstitutional 
indefiniteness has been used by the Supreme Court almost invariably for the creation 
of an insulating buffer zone of added protection at the peripheries of several of the 
Bill of Rights freedoms." [d. at 75. "It is evident that the First Amendment freedoms 
receive most solicitous protection from today's Court." [d. at 94. 
119. Memorandum from Larry L. Simms, U.S. Dept. of Justice Office of Legal 
Counsel to Davis R. Robinson, Legal Adviser U.S. Department of State *15 (Jul. 5, 
1984) (available in Georgia State University College of Law Library) ("We remain of 
the opinion, however, that on their face, the ITAR still present some areas of 
potentially unconstitutional application, and, moreover, that we cannot be certain 
whether existing case law would be sufficient to narrow the range of application to a 
constitutionally sufficient extent."). 
120. [d. at *5-*9, *15; Letter from Robert A. McConnell, U.S. Department of Justice, 
to Honorable Jake Garn, U.S. Senate *4 (1984) ("[We] concluded that the [!TAR] 
applied a prior restraint . . . to a wide variety of protected speech. . . . [S]uch speech 
would generally be protected by the First Amendment. . . . Our experience with . . . 
the ITAR, however, cause us concern that the task of narrowing this type of 
statutory scheme by regulation is formidable.") (available in Georgia State University 
College of Law Library). 
121. 58 Fed. Reg. 39,280 (1993). These amendments altered the definitions of 
"technical data," "expert," and "public domain." [d. 
122. Rubenstein, supra note 16, at *6-*7. 
123. [d. at *13-*14. 
124. "Source program" refers to the actual computer programming instructions that 
one may enter into a computer to enable it to perform a given function. RICHARD 
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algorithms, and a source disk, which contained the same source 
program as the book, but in magnetic form. 125 Karn was 
granted the license for export of the book, but denied a license for 
export of the disk on the grounds that the disk was a munition 
within the meaning of the ITAR.126 
In a separate incident, a California resident, Daniel Bernstein, 
sued the U.S. State Department in 1995 after it determined that 
Bernstein would need an ITAR export license to publish a 
scientific paper containing the source program for an encryption 
program.127 Critics view conflicts like these as evidence that the 
ITAR restrictions are overly vague.128 John Gilmore, the co-
founder of , the Electronic Frontier Foundation129 stated: 
There's a whole continuum [sic] between a book about 
cryptography, a book listing source code, an on-line copy of 
that book, a piece of actual source code, a piece of binary code 
stored on diskette, a piece of binary code loaded into a 
general-purpose computer, and a machine that does nothing 
but encoding and decoding. Somewhere along that continuum 
[sic], you go from having full rights to anything you want, to 
having no export rights. It's not clear where the line should 
be drawn.I30 
In his practitioner's analysis of the ITAR, Ira Rubenstein notes 
the vague interplay between the definitions of software, technical 
data, and public domain under the ITAR.131 He notes that 
although books about cryptography should be exportable under 
the public domain exception, it is not clear whether books 
published in an "on-line" format or with a source program 
HIPGRAVE, COMPUTING TERMS AND ACRONYMS: A DICTIONARY 101 (1985). 
125. Crypto Speech Case Heating Up: Software Engineer Threatens to Sue State Dept. 
Over Blocked Attempt To Export A Disk, INFo. L. ALERT: VOORHEES REP., Dec. 9, 
1994, at *1. 
126. See id. 
127. Export Control Case Exposes Conflict Between Speech and Security: Challenge Of 
Law Governing Shipping Cryptography Overseas May Be In For Rough Time In 
Federal Court, INFo. L. ALERT: VOORHEES REP., Mar. 10, 1995, at *1. Bernstein's suit 
later survived the U.S. Government's motion to dismiss, with the court holding that 
Bernstein presented a colorable Fifth Amendment void-for-vagueness claim. Bernstein, 
922 F. Supp. at 1439. 
128. EFF Sues, supra note 112, at 1-2. 
129. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a non-profit group which advocates 
civil liberties in electronic media, such as computers. Rubenstein, supra note 16, at 
*122 n.50. 
130. Id. at *13. 
131. Id. at *13-*16. 
18
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 14
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol13/iss2/14
HeinOnline -- 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 599 1996-1997
1997] RESTRICTIONS ON CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORTS 599 
diskette attached would fall under the software132 definition, 
the published work133 definition, or even the technical datal34 
definition. 135 
In the past, however, federal courts have attempted to narrow 
the vague provisions of the ITAR. In United States v. Edler 
Industries,136 the Ninth Circuit addressed the overly-broad 
definition of "technical data" under the predecessor regulations to 
the ITAR,137 stating that the definition was "susceptible of an 
overbroad interpretation .... A broad statutory reading, however, 
is neither necessary nor proper. In our opinion, technical data 
must relate in a significant fashion to some item on the 
Munitions List."13B 
The defendant in Edler was exporting technical data related to 
missile production, and while the court's narrowing 
interpretation that technical data must significantly relate to an 
item on the Munitions List, was sufficient to alleviate the 
immediate controversy in that case,139 it may not have 
significant impact on the PGP export situation. Although the 
current version of the ITAR recognizes that technical data must 
relate to items on the Munitions List to be subject to export 
restrictionsl40 (the narrowing construction in Edler), the Edler 
ruling does not seem to resolve any potential vagueness in the 
current ITAR's definition of technical data and its relationship to 
software. 
Philip Zimmermann has raised the additional issue of the 
potentially far-reaching meaning of "export" under the ITAR.141 
Under the expansive definition of export.under Section 120.17(a) 
132. See supra note 52 (defining "software" under the ITAR). 
133. See supra note 56 (defining published works, which fall under the "public 
domain" exception to the ITAR). 
134. See supra note 52 (defining "technical data" under the !TAR). 
135. Rubenstein, supra note 16, at *13-*14. Note that Rubenstein's question here is 
premised upon interpretation of yet another vague provision of the !TAR: whether 
public domain encryption software is subject to the public domain exception in 
§ 125.1 of the !TAR. Before even reaching the question of the definitional vagueness 
of software, Rubenstein assumed that public domain cryptographic software and 
technical data are not subject to the public domain exception of the ITAR. See 
generally id. at *6-*7. 
136. 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978). 
137. Mutual Security Act of 1954, ch. 937, 68 Stat. 832 (repealed 1976). 
138. 579 F.2d at 520. 
139. Id. at 518, 520-21. 
140. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.10(a)(1), 121.1 Category XIII(k), 125.1(a) (1995). 
141. Hearings, supra note 35 (statement of Philip Zimmermann). 
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of the ITAR,t42 a Boeing executive who carries his notebook 
computer to the Paris airshow and sends a PGP-encl'ypted 
electronic mail message to his office in Seattle (without first 
obtaining an export license) would be in violation of the ITAR 
and subject to criminal sanctions. l43 Yet, it seems doubtful that 
a reasonable person would interpret the ITAR to prohibit this 
type of behavior. 
v. THE UNITED STATES MUNITIONS LIST AS A POLITICAL QUESTION 
Despite the potential validity of any First or Fifth Amendment 
attack on the constitutionality of the ITAR licensing scheme for 
public cryptography, a 1990 Eleventh Circuit decision may render 
all these arguments moot. In United States v. Martinez,l44 the 
court reviewed the appellants' conviction, under AEeA and ITAR, 
for the export of ''Video cipher II," a piece of cryptographic 
hardware that is a defense article subject to ITAR export 
restrictions. 145 
Appellants' defense, similar to a potential defense for the 
export of PGP, rested upon a First Amendment overbreadth 
argument.146 They claimed that the inclusion of cryptographic 
devices on the United States Munitions List was "overbroad 
because [the general heading of cryptographic devices and 
software] includes items already in the public domain whose 
dissemination would pose no security threat, and which lack any 
characteristic that is inherently or predominantly military.,,147 
In rejecting this defense, the court held that placement of 
items on the Munitions List was a political question, and 
therefore excluded from judicial review. l48 The court cited three 
reasons to support this conclusion: (1) a lack of judicially 
manageable standards to determine whether the cryptographic 
item belonged on the Munitions List, (2) the court's lack of access 
to the classified intelligence reports upon which placement 
decisions are made, and (3) recent congressional amendments to 
142. See supra note 51 (defining "export" under the ITAR). 
143. Hearings, supra note 35 (statement of Philip Zimmermann). 
144. 904 F.2d 601 (11th eir. 1990). 
145. [d. 
146. [d. A potential First Amendment overbreadth argument for the free distribution 
of PGP is addressed supra, Section III of this Note. 
147. [d. 
148. Id. at 602. 
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the AECA which precluded judicial review of the Munitions 
List. 149 
The political question doctrine, upon which the Martinez court 
based its decision, traces its origins to the landmark 1849 
decision in Luther v. Borden. 150 There, in the context of a 
dispute over Article IV of the U.S. Constitution and the 
legitimacy of the government of Rhode Island, Chief Justice 
Taney determined that interference in certain domestic concerns 
of a state are political in nature and, therefore, cannot be 
reviewed by the judicial branch.151 
Although the exact boundaries of the political question doctrine 
are unclear, it has, subsequent to Luther, been applied in several 
areas, including foreign affairs, amendments to the Constitution, 
the Guaranty Clause, and political gerrymandering. 152 In an 
attempt to delineate a somewhat nebulous concept, one 
commentator identified three important components of this 
doctrine: (1) the Court, due to lack of information, cannot fully 
clarify the relevant questions involved, (2) the Court will defer to 
the constitutionally proper decisions of another branch, and (3) 
the Court will defer to the wider responsibilities of the elected 
branches. 153 
The placement of cryptographic software such as PGP on the 
U.S. Munitions List could be a non-justiciable political question 
under the Martinez rationale. Much of the information regarding 
the security threat of cryptographic software is classified and not 
available to the COurtS,l54 and both the President and Congress 
are well within their constitutional authority in regulating the 
export of munitions. 155 
However, one commentator has rejected the use of the political 
question doctrine to preclude judicial review in the area of 
foreign affairs. 156 In his thorough examination of the 
Constitution and national security, Harold Koh asserts that the 
three traditional arguments supporting the non-justiciability of 
149. [d. at 602-03. 
150. 48 U.S. 1 (1849). 
151. [d. at 42. 
152. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 102, § 2.15, at 108-12. 
153. [d. at 114. 
154. Martinez, 904 F.2d at 602. 
155. See discussion of Congressional and Presidential authority to regulate arms 
exports, supra Section II of this Note. 
156. KOH, supra note 105, at 220-24. 
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foreign affairs issues lack merit. They are: an inability to derive 
principled standards, the informational inability of the judiciary 
to make foreign affairs decisions, and separation of powers 
issues. 157 He further states that the courts have "excluded 
themselves too thoroughly from the national security area"158 
and that a "rich historical tradition of judicial decision making in 
foreign affairs,"159 as well as principles of federalism, require 
the judiciary to assume a more active role in national security 
and foreign affairs decisionmaking.16o 
This line of reasoning is further supported by the nature of the 
rights involved in a prohibition of the export of PGP. Adjudging 
PGP's export control a political question would run afoul of the 
Supreme Court's general unwillingness to apply the political 
question doctrine to issues when individual liberties, protected by 
the Bill of Rights, are implemented. 161 
The Bernstein court agreed with this reasoning. 162 In an 
opinion upholding the justiciability of the plaintiffs claim that 
cryptographic software should not be included on the U.S. 
Munitions List, the court did not dispute that the plain language 
of the AECA precluded judicial review of commodity jurisdiction 
determinations. 163 However, the plaintiffs claim was best 
described as a constitutional challenge to a federal statute, not a 
review of a specific commodity jurisdiction decision.164 
Therefore, this constitutional question was best resolved by the 
judicial branch.165 
CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the merits of any potential constitutional 
argument against the validity of the ITAR and its application to 
the Zimmermann case, it is uncontroverted that Zimmermann's 
situation and the similar situations of others have engendered 
diverse opposition to the ITAR.166 Bills have been introduced in 
157. [d. at 221-22. 
158. Id. at 183. 
159. Id. at 220. 
160. [d. at 223-24. 
161. [d. at 220; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 102, § 2.15, at 114. 
162. 922 F. Supp. at 1431-36. 
163. [d. at 1431. 
164. [d. 
165. Id. 
166. Bulkeley, supra note 5, at A8. 
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Congress to relax the ITAR export restrictions on cryptographic 
software.167 Even the late Ron Brown, former U.S. Secretary of 
Commerce, urged that the United States ease the ITAR export 
controls on cryptographic software. 168 
Further, in direct response to the Zimmermann and Bernstein 
cases, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) sponsored a 
lawsuit in early 1995, seeking to restrict the federal government 
from regulating cryptographic exports.169 The EFF suit claimed 
that the ITAR, as applied to' cryptography, was in violation of 
both the First and Fifth Amendments.170 
Perhaps the best indication of the legal infirmity of the U.S. 
Government's restriction of cryptographic exports is the federal 
government's own resolution of the Philip Zimmermann 
investigation. In January, 1996, the U.S. Attorney responsible for 
the criminal investigation of Zimmermann announced that the 
government had decided to drop the prosecution and not seek an 
indictment.l7l No reason was given for the decision.172 
A professor of law has stated that the right to "speak" 
cryptographically is protected by the U.S. Constitution as much 
as "the right to speak Navajo .... The government has no 
particular right to prevent [someone] from speaking in a 
technological manner even if it is inconvenient for them to 
understand."173 It is therefore essential that any governmental 
restraints on rights as fundamental as free speech or the right to 
practice one's chosen profession advance a compelling 
167. In 1993, Representative Maria Cantwell of Washington introduced a bill to the 
U.S. House of Representatives that would have relaxed the ITAR export restrictions. 
John Schwartz, Bill Would Ease Curbs on Encoding Software Exports, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 23, 1993, at Cl. The bill did not pass, but it may have impacted the 1993 
amendments to the ITAR that liberalized the export controls on mass-market software 
products with cryptographic ability. See 58 Fed. Reg. 39,290 (July 22, 1993). 
A similar bill was introduced to the U.S. Senate in 1996 by Senator Conrad 
Burns of Montana and to the U.S. House of Representatives by Representative Bob 
Goodlatte of Virginia. Scott Ritter, Congress Urged to Lift Ban On Data Encryption 
Exports, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, June 26, 1996. 
168. Dinah Zeiger, Brown to Urge Easing Export Controls on Encryption Software, 
DENVER POST, Jan. 13, 1996, at El. 
169. EFF Sues, supra note 112, at 1. 
170. [d. at 2. 
171. Elizabeth Weise, Privacy Software Writer Won't Be Prosecuted, ATLANTA J. & 
CONST., Jan. 16, 1996, at D6. 
172. [d. 
173. Markoff, supra note 9, at D3 (quoting Professor Eben Moglen, Columbia 
University School of Law). 
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governmental interest in a narrowly tailored fashion. The ITAR, 
however, may not advance such a compelling interest, given the 
worldwide proliferation of good cryptographic software in the 
public domain. In addition, the ITAR definitions have not kept up 
with the rapid changes in computer technology, and therefore 
may not give sufficient notice of the type of conduct that is 
prohibited under the ITAR, which lends support to an argument 
that the ITAR is unconstitutionally vague. 
Ronald J. Stay 
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